The left must stop falling for far right left behind narratives and see the working class in all its diversity
(a short version was published on Novara)
Four years ago, after the consecutive shocks of the Brexit victory in the EU referendum and Donald Trump’s election to the presidency of the United States, it became common to hear that these events had the same source: the discontent of the working class, the ’left behind’ who had risen up against the disconnected elite. Leaders of both reactionary projects were quick to push a narrative positing them as heads of the revolt, with Nigel Farage stating in The Telegraph in the lead up of the US election:
The similarities between the different sides in this election are very like our own recent battle. As the rich get richer and big companies dominate the global economy, voters all across the West are being left behind. The blue-collar workers in the valleys of South Wales angry with Chinese steel dumping voted Brexit in their droves. In the American rust belt, traditional manufacturing industries have declined, and it is to these people that Trump speaks very effectively
Quickly, this self-serving assessment spread across the media and was uncritically adopted on both sides of the political spectrum. This was despite growing evidence that neither success was principally derived from a working class uprising, but rather predominantly found support from those you would expect would side with such elite and reactionary interests.
Four years on, and despite Trump’s defeat, it is disheartening to see that the same old narratives are still being pushed, particularly on the left.
But first, a couple of caveats to avoid common misunderstanding. First, ‘working class’ is used here in a loose manner rather than a precise political construct. What I am interested in here is the way it is constructed in our public discourse, and particularly within the media, based on opinion polls, and usually including those on a lower income and with lower formal educational qualifications. Second, the point is not to deny that some working class people are voting for the (far) right, that there is racism within working class communities, or that this is not concerning, worthy of study or worth combatting. On the contrary. The point is not only that this support is exaggerated, but that this has consequences. It does very little to address the problem of working class people turning to the far right or adopting racist behaviours, and also diverts attention from the problems facing the working class more generally. Besides, and despite recent moral panics, working class support for the (far) right is sadly nothing new: in the parliamentary left’s heyday in France and the UK, at least a quarter of unskilled workers turned to the right.
Back in 2016 when this narrative became commonplace, it was already clear that Trump’s election was not the working class breakthrough many were eager to see and capitalise on. As I have shown elsewhere with Aaron Winter, while Trump did better than the two preceding Republican candidates among those on a lower income, his ‘breakthrough’ had more to do with the extremely poor performance of Hillary Clinton, who suffered a massive loss compared to Barack Obama. More telling perhaps, Trump’s performance was similar to George W. Bush’s, meaning that his appeal did necessarily not reach beyond traditional Republican demographics, as was plastered across the news.
Early polls suggest that 2020 has confirmed this trend.
Of course, there are sections within the “working class” where Trump did particularly well, such as white men without college degrees. But the lack of college education is only part of the picture when we think about the working class. If we look at income, Biden has a significant lead over Trump in the lower income categories, as did Clinton with the lowest brackets. If that is not enough, Trump made some headway only with those who earn more than $100,000: he appealed to 48% of them in 2016 vs 54% in 2020 and it is probably where his uptake in votes came from.
If we base the size of the various categories of income in the electorate on 2016 numbers, Trump received around 31% of his share of the vote from this category in 2020 (or around 22 million votes out of his 72 million total), meaning that more than two thirds of his share of the vote came from those earning $50,000 and above, and in fact almost 40% from voters earning $100,000 and above. Would everything be fine if ‘only’ 50 million middle and upper class voters had found Trump appealing? Should some of the blame and concern not rest with the almost 30 million voters on more than $100,000 who were comfortable throwing the bulk of their fellow citizens under the bus for selfish personal gain? Surely the problem with Trump and Trumpism goes beyond the “working class”.
But let’s explore this further. While we are still waiting for more detail, even if the majority of white voters without degrees and low income had voted for Trump, which is already unlikely, what is pretty certain is that the majority of working class voters did not. In fact, we could add that it is also very unlikely that the majority of white people without a college degree and on a low income would have either. Why is that? Quite simply because the less formally educated you are and the lower on the income scale, the more likely you are not to vote or even be registered.
Of course, that does not mean that non-voters would necessarily be progressive if they were forced to vote or that they would not turn to Trump. But the simple fact is they do not; this is their choice, and one that is admirable when they are told day in, day out, that Trump is their candidate.
Therefore, this focus on a minority of working class voters by any standard and understanding begs the question: why it is those who made the active choice to turn to Trump, knowing full well what his politics are and that he could indeed win, who deserve to be listened to and appealed to by the left? Why is it not the many more who stuck to a Democratic candidate with a less than impressive record on workers rights, but voted for him to prevent the worst from happening? Why should the left listen to those few who sided with the most damaging programme for working class interests, which particularly targeted racialised working class minorities, rather than listen to those who were actually at the sharp end of these politics? Similarly, do those working class people who abstained or were unregistered deserve less attention than those who turned their back on their class to side with elite and racist interests? Would they be harder to bring back and convince to vote for a truly progressive programme than those who made an active choice towards hatred? Possibly, but even so they would deserve the energy far more than those who are most likely too far gone and would only be brought back at a huge cost to those who have already suffered so much.
So why is it so urgent and important for the left to be more careful when we talk about the working class and the far right?
Uncritically linking both plays right into the hands of the far right. Why would they delight in these narratives if it does not serve their interests? Surely, if Trump and Farage want to claim the working class as their own, we should not grant them their wish particularly when it’s baseless. Doing so is not just intellectually lazy, it is also incredibly patronising to the working class. It presumes that they are on the whole foolish enough to think their interests are represented by elitist clowns in golden elevators. It also whitewashes how diverse the working class is and the very clear and simple fact that those who are at the sharp end of far right politics are also more likely than not to be part of that working class. Interestingly, these same people are often on the front line of the more progressive movements and politics, but more often than not will end up voting for dithering centre left parties, just to ensure the worst is avoided.
These narratives also exonerate the middle and upper class who provide the bulk of the vote for the far right and reactionary leaders, but are somehow exempt from taking the blame. It is to them we must turn our attention.
Of course, this does not mean that there is any room for complacency or that the working class should be taken for granted. As I explained, abstention has become a mainstay in these demographics who no longer feel naturally represented by the left. Mugs and dogwhistling about immigration have not stemmed the tide, quite the contrary. Therefore, it is not just crucial to change the narrative and stop playing on the (far) right’s turf, but turn truly and fully to the hard work of rebuilding bridges between the communities who have not only suffered most from our reactionary times, but would have most to gain in a common struggle for progressive politics, which can only and ever be possible when it is against all and every form of oppression.
